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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRoCEss-EQuAL PROTECTION OF THE LAwsANn-"STRmE Surr'' LEGISLATION HELD CoNsTITUTIONAL-Plaintiff brought a
derivative suit against the defendant, a Delaware corporation, in a United States
district court in New Jersey. While the suit was in process, New Jersey passed a
statute permitting a corporation in whose name a suit was brought to demand
security for reasonable expenses including attorney fees. 1 The plaintiff stockholder was to be liable for such expenses if the suit was unsuccessful. The statute
was not to apply when the complainant's holding represented 5% of the par or
stated value of the corporation's outstanding stock or had a value of $50,000.
Since the act applied to suits in which no £nal judgment had been rendered, the
defendant moved 'to require security. The district court ruled the statute not
applicable to an action in the federal courts. After the circuit court reversed, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed. Assuming that expenses can
be secured only from the time the statute becomes effective, the statute is not
unconstitutionally retroactive nor a denial of due process or equal protection of
the laws. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct.
1221 (1949).2
Where the practical effect of legislation has been to deny access to the courts,
the Supreme Court has held it unconstitutional as a deprivation of due process.8
Imposing liability for attorney fees on the unsuccessful party is not in itself a
denial of due process,4 but such imposition will be invalid if resort to the courts
is practically prohibited.5 It is settled too that the equal protection clause is not
a guarantee against discriminatory legislation, if the discrimination bears a direct
and reasonable relation to an end which is legitimate. 6 Since costs and attorney
fees generally will be prohibitive, even though reasonable, this statute will
undoubtedly foreclose most minority stockholder suits in New Jersey regardless
of their merit. 7 Its practical and substantial effect will be to deny access to the
courts to stockholders who do not hold 5% or $50,000 worth of the corporation
stock. Although this statute would seem, therefore, to present very grave problems
of due process and equal protection, the Court did not £nd it necessary to consider
N.J. Stat. Ann. (1946) tit. 14:3-15, added by N.J. Laws (1945) c. 131.
In addition, the plaintiff objected that the order denying the motion was not a final
judgment and not appealable, and that the statute was merely procedural and should not be
applied by the federal courts. The court in the principal case decided against him on all points.
a Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441 (1908); Chicago and N.W. Ry. v. Nye
Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 43 S.Ct. 55 (1922); Wadley S. Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235
U.S. 651, 35 S.Ct. 214 (1914); Oklahoma Qperating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331, 40 S.Ct.
338 (1919).
4 Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCray,·291 U.S. 566, 54 S.Ct. 482 (1933).
5 Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., supra, note 3.
6 Quaker Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 48 S.Ct. 553 (1928); Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 515, 49 S.Ct. 235 (1929).
7 See Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 49 N.Y.S. (2d) 64 (1944) where the cost was $113,000.
Corporate expenses in the principal case will be increased by a provision in the corporate
by-laws which require the corporation to indemnify its directors who are successful defendants in a derivative suit. See Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Smith, (C.C.A. 3d, 1948)
170 F. (2d) 44.
1
2

1950]

RECENT DECISIONS

707

them at any length. The decision seems to be based squarely upon the :fiduciary
character of the stockholder's derivative suit. In the view of the Court, stockholders prosecuting such a suit act in a fiduciary capacity not technically as trustees
but as representatives of other stockholder interests. Since litigation involving
fiduciaries is peculiarly susceptible to control by the states and since corporations
are creatures of the states, the states have plenary power over such corporate
fiduciary litigation. It is becoming increasingly clear that stockholders in a
derivative suit do act in a fiduciary or quasi-trust relationship. They can be held
accountable to the corporation for the proceeds of a derivative action whether
such proceeds are in the form of a judgment or a settlement8 The theory of the
fiduciary character of the suit was developed primarily to curb unmeritorious
suits;9 it is now used to justify the virtual elimination of most derivative suits
regardless of merit. Further, even though the states, as the principal case indicates,
can close their courts to this type of litigation, they must still provide equal
protection of the laws.10 By treating the equal protection objection rather summarily in the principal case, the Court leaves the impression that equal protection,
when a state has the power to eliminate a type of suit, is something different from
a case where a state does not have such power. It is now clearly settled that the
states may go ahead with this type of legislation.11 Settled too is the fact that
where such legislation is in force minority stockholders have virtually no feasible
means to charge official misconduct in corporate affairs.

Joseph Gricar, S.Ed.

BSee Certain-Teed Products Co. v. Topping, (C.C.A. 2d, 1948) 171 F. (2d) 241, and
Clark v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E. (2d) 443 (1947). Cf. Young v. Higbe Co., 324
U.S. 204, 65 S.Ct. 594 (1944), noted, 45 CoL, L. REv. 625 (1945).
9 See 24 N.Y. U:mv. L. Q. REv. 395 (1949) where repeal of a similar New York law is
advocated. It is suggested that the New York rule requiring ownership of the stock at the
time of the alleged wrong and at the time of suit, plus the trust character of the recoveey
proceeds would effectively bar strike suits.
10 Southern R.R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 30 S.Ct. 287 (1910). Power Manufac.
turing Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 47 S.Ct. 678 (1927).
11 New York pioneered this type of legislation, N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law 61B. After
conflicting opinions in the lower courts the New York Court of Appeals held the statute con•
stitutional. Lapchak v. Baker, 298 N.Y. 89, 80 N.E. (2d) 751 (1948). For a history and
criticism of the New York law, see Zlinkofl: "The American Investor and the Constitutionality
of Section 61B of the New York General Corporation Law," 54 YALE L.J. 352 (1945) and
Hornstein, ''The Death Knell of Stockholders Derivative Suits in New York," 32 CAL. L.
REv. 123 (1944). For a discussion of the most recent state act, see Ballantine, "Abuses of
Shareholders' Derivative Suits: How far is California's New 'Securities for Expenses' Act
Sound Regulation," 37 CALIP. L._REv. 399 (1949).

